主  題:Does Overconfidence lead to more entrusted Loans? Evidence from Chinese listed firms

內(nèi)容簡介:The study analyzes the entrusted loans from 2007 to 2016 from listed firms in China, investigating the relationship between managers’ overconfidence and firms’ allocation of entrusted loans, and how the relationship varies with firms’ level of free cash flow and internal governance. Our results reveal that managers’ overconfidence affects firms’ decisions on entrusted loans positively, the more overconfident the managers is, the more possibility that firm will lend and at a high level. Further exploration indicates that overconfident managers are more motivated to distribute entrusted loans and with large amount if the firm has sufficient free cash flows, additionally, the internal governance as represented by CEO duality and large shareholders’ ownership are found to be effective in explaining the issuance of entrusted loans in firms with overconfidence managers, however, overconfident managers in state-owned firms perform greater inclination to lend.

報(bào)告人:許力      講師

時(shí)  間:2018-11-28    15:30

地  點(diǎn):位育樓117

舉辦單位:銀行與貨幣研究院